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In the second part - Or , he criticizes this a superficial take on life and argues for the ethical perspective: the nourishment of the soul and not just of the senses.

Because of their cerebral compatibility, I wonder what Kierkegaard would have made of Oscar Wilde, and vice versa.

When I say cerebral compatibility, I mean their extreme genius, their willingness to hold two opposing viewpoints at the same time, their ability to reference other works of literature ad infinitum, their linguistic superiority and wordsmithery.

Personally, I opt for a both-and one an expression which we have in Danish. I tried to read a minimum of ten pages at a time, but it turned out to be a maximum.

I often went back to reread a sentence which often began three lines above to glean the exact meaning. Also the inflections of verbs were different, and his punctuation — run-on clauses with only commas to separate them — would make me breathless.

The Germanic capitalization of nouns was a detail in the bigger picture. There was much I marvelled at, much I admired but also quite a bit I disagreed with.

His view of women, for instance; he seems stuck in the 19th century women are not born to work but are flighty, imaginative creatures, etc.

Moreover, his reliance on God is a far cry from the rather a-religious Denmark of today and sometimes seemed at odds with his sharp, intellectual observations.

Though he is often considered the father of existentialism, his particular branch was more religious than the later existentialists of the 20th century.

Anxiety, for instance, is produced by our reflecting on things and as such, he claims, thus different from sorrow.

It is always connected to time in the sense that you cannot be anxious about the present but only about what is past or what is in the future. Sorrow, on the other hand is bound to the present.

This was something I pondered at length and which, like many of his other points and arguments, raised questions rather than gave any clear answers.

Another point he made, which I immediately took to heart, is that we must not be too busy. Nobody returns from the dead, nobody has entered the world without crying; no one asks you when you want in, no one asks you when you want out.

An individual who hopes for eternal life is in a sense an unhappy individual insofar as he relinquishes the present, but is not in a stricter sense unhappy because he is present within this hope.

Can you long for what you already possess? Yes, when you imagine that in the next moment you may no longer possess it. One of Denmark's three literary triumvirs, if you ask me, the other two being Hans Christian Andersen and Karen Blixen.

Recommended for the patient and philosophically-minded reader. View all 23 comments. One world. One destination. But two different strokes for two very different types of folks.

The Eithers - and the Ors. Will they both get to their destination? Yet both are an accepted part of modern reality.

Riddle me that, Zeno! All bets are off, friends! So who gets the Real Trophy first - the Eithers or the Ors? And is it worth it to know?

Get used to it. And this book is an elusively allusive deconstruction of the inner dialectics of that world.

For they just wanted Freedom. That carries an enormous price, friends, just so you know Kierkegaard, though, tried to tell us postmoderns that only the Truth will set us Free, and so he has been relegated to the dustbin of oblivion by the Sleep of Society.

For Kierkegaard will take you on a marvellous trip. Feb 27, Roy Lotz rated it really liked it Shelves: eurotrip , footnotes-to-plato.

Of course, a critic resembles a poet to a hair, except that he has no anguish in his heart, no music on his lips. This is one of those rare unclassifiable books, whose genre was born the day it was published and which has since left no heirs.

Kierkegaard gives us what appears, at first, to be a sort of literary experiment: the papers of two imaginary characters, found inside the escritoire by a third imaginary character.

Specifically, Kierkegaard uses these two personages to juxtapose the aesthetic with the ethical modes of life, presumably asking the reader to choose between them.

Part 1, by A, gives us the aesthetic man. Part 2 is more focused, consisting of two long letters sent by B who is supposed to be a middle-aged judge to A, both exhorting the latter to turn towards a more ethical view of life.

The styles of the two writers are suitably different: A is excitable, hyperbolic, and aphoristic, while B is more staid and focused.

Nevertheless, it is never difficult to tell that Kierkegaard is the true author. Neatly summarizing the difference in perspectives would be difficult, since Kierkegaard tends to be flexible with his own definitions.

In the first, A is concerned with attaining a maximum of pleasure. He is not a hedonist, and is not very interested in sex.

Rather, he is interested in avoiding boredom by carefully shaping his developing relationship like a well-plotted novel, ensuring that each emotion is felt to the utmost.

The judge, by contrast, sees marriage as far preferable to seduction, since it is through commitments like marriage that the inner self develops and becomes fully actualized.

While the aesthete prefers to live in the moment, the ethical man notes that, even if every moment is novel, the self remains the same.

Change requires commitment. Interpreting the book is difficult. Are we being asked to make a choice in values?

Such a choice could have no basis but chance or personal whim, since no pre-existing value could guide us between two incompatible value-systems.

This, you might say, is the existentialist interpretation of the book: the primacy of choice over values.

Yet other options are available. There is also the unmistakable autobiographical element in this writing, since Kierkegaard had not long before broken off his own engagement.

This is just to scrape the surface of possibility. On the one hand, this book is highly rich and suggestive, with brilliant passages buried amid piles of less compelling material.

Since no clear message emerges, and since there are no arguments to guide the way, the book can easily yield interpretations consonant with pre-conceived opinions.

In other words, it is hard to me to imagine somebody being convinced to change their mind by reading this. But Kierkegaard can perhaps better be likened to a good art critic than to a systematic philosopher, for the value in his writing consists more in illuminating comments than in a final conclusion.

At times he rises to commanding eloquence; but so often he seems to wallow in confusing and repetitive intricacies. More to the point, I find the general tenor of his writing to be anti-rationalist; and this is exemplified in the complete lack of argument in his writings.

But nobody could deny that, all told, this is an extraordinary book and a worthy addition to the philosophical tradition.

View all 9 comments. Nov 09, Brent McCulley rated it it was amazing Shelves: philosophy. Easily one of the best books I have read this year, as this year nears the end, I can say without a doubt that Kierkegaard was truly a genius.

It is not without purpose that my mind immediately rushes to Nietzsche pithy aphorism on genius wherein he writes, "Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than being misunderstood.

In the latter case, perhaps his vanity suffers, but the former hurts his heart, his sympathy, which always says, "Alas, why do you want to have it as hard as I d Easily one of the best books I have read this year, as this year nears the end, I can say without a doubt that Kierkegaard was truly a genius.

In the latter case, perhaps his vanity suffers, but the former hurts his heart, his sympathy, which always says, "Alas, why do you want to have it as hard as I did?

Kierkegaard knew that he was a genius, yet he also knew that he was misunderstood. This seems to me not to be a accidental product of the Danish culture's ability to exegete Kierkegaard properly, but rather, an intentional property postulated by Kierkegaard himself within his writings for the sole purpose of protecting "his heart, his sympathy" as Nietzsche said.

While reading through the "Either" part, I felt ecstatic, aroused, and excited, as the aesthetic appeal and philosophical dialectic that A engages in truly is seductive.

The first portion is a bunch of aphorisms whereof all are highly quotable and attractive, and standard Kierkegaard. He then deals with the dialectic progression of the erotic understanding in music, and analyzes Mozart among others.

Kierkegaard then deals with the Ancient's understanding of tragedy juxtaposed to the modern understanding of tragedy. In "Shadowgraphs," Kierkegaard deals with the aesthetic elements of theater and the psychological development of the aforesaid in the subject.

My two favorite essays, however, are the next two which are entitled "The Unhappiest One" and "Crop Rotation. Both are written so fantastically that it hard not to agree with everything he says.

My understanding of Either could only have developed after reading Or , and it's understandable why Kierkegaard got so mad seeing Danish bookstores lined with the former whilst the latter went neglected compared to the former.

They must be read in conjunction with one another, because all the ideas presented in both are not necessarily Kierkegaard's own ideas: this is a partial reason for the pseudonyms.

Since this was Kierkegaard's first major work, written mostly in Germany in a short amount of time while he was attending the Schelling lectures, the breakup with Regine, his then fiancee, would have been extremely fresh.

The aesthetic part of Either seems to be Kierkegaard's self-justification of the breakup, rationalizing that it was done in protection of Regine, and also, at the consummation of what Kierkegaard calls "first love.

Certainly, then, The Seducer's diary can be read in a but of an autobiographical flair, and indeed it writes like one, although often times Kierkegaard flips the subjects around.

What is more interesting is when I got to the Or portion. Written by a venerable Judge Wilhelm, they are two letters of correspondence to A, as in the 'novel' both the Judge and A are good friends, and A often comes over frequently to dine and spend time with the Judge and his wife.

The Judge systematically tries to refute the aesthetic in each theory postulated, and ultimately show the validity of marriage ethically and also aesthetically.

So far, then, it is not a matter of the choice of some thing, not a matter of the reality of the thing chosen, but of the reality of choosing.

It is this, though, that is decisive and what I shall try to awaken you to Through the absolute choice, then, the ethical is posited, but from that it by no means follows that the aesthetic is excluded.

In the ethical the personality is centered in itself; the aesthetic is thus excluded absolutely, or it is excluded as the absolute, but relatively it always stays behind.

The personality, through choosing itself, chooses itself ethically and excludes the aesthetic absolutely; but since it is, after all, he himself the person chooses and through choosing himself does not become another nature but remains himself, the whole of the aesthetic returns in its relativity" pp.

This is utterly brilliant, and to be sure, much of what Kierkegaard writes through the Judge are philosophical ideas that are further developed in his later works such as the movement from the aesthetic to the religious to the ethical in his Stages on Life's Way , and also the idea of choosing the self which lies in the infinite or absolute in The Sickness unto Death.

The idea that Judge defends from the above, and indeed throughout his two essays to A, is that the aesthetic cannot be chosen as the absolute, because it is not a choice at all, but rather a defiance or privation away from the absolute, and hence because the self is lost, it follows that the self cannot choose the aesthetic since their is no self to do the choosing.

Yet, when one postulates the ethical as the absolute, the self chooses absolutely because the choice is choosing yourself, which only can be found in the ethical, and because the ethical is the absolute, and the self is chosen, the aesthetic no thereby nullified as A would like to suppose, but is in fact affirmed, albeit in the relative sense of the subject.

And so it follows that marriage, which is the ethical choice, affirms both the ethical and the aesthetic, the moral and the sensual.

What is so paradoxical about all this is that Kierkegaard is writing this only because he was able to since he broke off engagement with his previous fiancee, Regine Olson.

Affirming the ethical validity of marriage, writing as the Judge, only after he denied it's validity practically by rejecting Regine. Incidentally enough, Kierkegaard would later regret not marrying, which makes his aphorism in the beginning of the book all the more poignant and chagrin.

If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry, you will also regret it; if you marry or if you do not marry, you will regret both; whether you marry or you do not marry, you will regret both" p.

View 1 comment. Jan 28, Sean Blake rated it it was amazing Shelves: religion , philosophy , fiction. Soren Kierkegaard writes like a poet, which makes his philosophical writings so entertaining and enlightening to read.

A guide to a meaningful existence, Kierkegaard explores the aesthetic and ethical ideologies of life through two characters: A , the aesthetician and Judge Wilhelm , the ethicist.

Part I is an exploration of aesthetic ideologies discussing music, poetry, boredom and which also includes Diary of a Seducer , a lovely little psychological novel within the book in which a calculated aesthetician seducts and then rejects the love of a woman.

Here, he takes his time, in two long letters, to explain how we should live our life, the choices we make and the extremities of certain life views.

With this structure, Kierkegaard explores human nature philosophically, psychologically, religiously and poetically in his first published work.

It's an exceptionally complex book but, in the end, it's extremely rewarding. View 2 comments. Sep 09, AJ Griffin rated it really liked it.

There cannot be injustice against ones own chattels or children, or towards oneself. There can be justice between husband and wife, and within families.

But this is not political justice. VII: Political justice is either natural or legal. The natural is that which is the same everywhere, independent of people's opinions, while laws can differ greatly.

Among the gods, all justice is presumably immutable, but in our world, all things are subject to change, but there is only one natural form of government, namely the best.

VIII: If a man seized the hand of another and used it to strike a third man, then the second man would not have acted voluntarily.

Thus, there are three kinds of injury. One that happens contrary to reasonable expectation is a misadventure. That which might be expected but is done without malice is a mistake.

Those who commit these have done wrong, but may not be unjust or wicked. Only the wrong done on purpose is unjust and wicked.

Mistakes committed in ignorance and from ignorance are pardonable; but those committed in ignorance but through some unnatural passion are inexcusable.

IX: Consider Euripides' lines: I slew my mother, that's my tale in brief, By will of both, or both unwilling? Is it possible to suffer injustice willingly?

At first this seems an odd notion, but people can be treated justly when they do not will it. So, to the formula 'doing harm to another, with knowledge of the other, of the instrument and of the manner', must we add 'against the will of the other'?

But no-one wills what he does not think to be good. Even if he gives his goods away, it is he who chooses so. It is clear that being treated unjustly must be involuntary.

There remain two problems- is the person who gives too large a share or the one who receives it the guilty one? True, the equitable man tends to take less than his due, but he may gain in status and nobility.

Also, can an inanimate object, or a slave at his master's command, 'do' what is unjust without acting unjustly? But legal and natural justice differ.

To commit adultery or assault or pass a bribe is clearly wrong. But as in medicine, where anyone can know what hellebore is and what surgery is, the skill lies in using them in a particular way.

X: Sometimes we commend the equitable as 'good', but at other times it seems unjust. But, at least in laws, there is no contradiction here, for the error lies not in the law but in the nature of the case.

So when an exception case arises, which the law-maker has not anticipated, then it is right that the judge act as the law-maker would have, had he known the circumstances.

Equity, though just, is not better than natural justice, but, like the flexible rulers Lesbian architects use, it allows laws to be framed to fit the circumstances.

XI: Whether a man can treat himself unjustly should now be evident. If a man kills himself, he is acting unjustly. But towards whom?

It is towards the State that man owes duty, so if he takes his own life the State properly dishonours him. But no one can commit adultery with his own wife, or burgle his own house.

It is clear that both being treated unjustly and acting unjustly are evils, for the first is to have less and the second to have more than the mean.

But acting unjustly is the worse, for it is voluntary. This completes our analysis of justice. I: We have already said that one should aim at the mean between deficiency and excess, as right principle dictates.

But if you grasped only this, you would have no knowledge of how to apply it. Hence, we must discover what the right principle is.

Let us begin by noting that the soul has a rational and an irrational part. And we may likewise divide the rational into the scientific, which deals of things invariable, and the calculative, which deals with the variable.

II: In the soul three things control actions; sensation, intellect and appetite. Since moral virtue involves choice, and choice is deliberate appetite then, if the choice is to be good, the reasoning behind it must be true and the desire right.

The origin of action is choice, and the origin of choice is appetite and purposive reasoning. But no process is set going by mere thought- only by practical thought.

Anyone who makes anything makes if for a purpose relative to a particular end. But action is an end in itself, and man is the causative union of reason and appetite.

No past event is an object of choice; hence, Agathon was right to say: One thing is denied even to God To undo what has been already done III: To look further back, we can say that there are five ways in which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation or denial; by art, science, prudence, wisdom and intuition.

Judgement and opinion need not be included as they can often err. Science aims at knowledge of the eternal and is supposed to be teachable. But all teaching starts from what is known either by induction of first principles or by deduction from those first principles.

This is our description of scientific knowledge. IV: Art, or craft skill, is concerned with bringing something into existence, the cause of which is reasoned in the producer not the product.

Since production is different to action, art is not concerned with action but has an element of chance, as Agathon says: Art loves chance, and chance loves art.

V: To understand prudence, or practical wisdom, we may consider what type of person we call prudent.

A prudent man is able to deliberate rightly, not just about particular things like health, but about the good life generally.

As prudence is not a fixed thing, then it cannot be a science. It does not aim at production, so it is not an art. Prudence, then, is a virtue, and one which is of the calculative, reasoning part of the soul.

But it is not merely a rational state, for such can be forgotten while prudence cannot. VI: Let us consider intuition. All science comes from certain first principles, so it follows that those principles cannot themselves be comprehended by science, or by art, or prudence or even by wisdom.

The state of mind which apprehends first principles is intuition. VII: When we call Phidias a wise sculptor or Polyclitus a wise portraitist we mean that they have artistic wisdom.

But some people are not wise 'at something' but wise without any qualification. Wisdom, therefore, seems the most finished form of knowledge.

Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious. That is why a wise person can often be more effective in action than one with specialist knowledge.

VIII: Prudence and political science are the same state of mind, but they are realised differently. The man who knows and provides for his own interests is called prudent, but politicians are considered meddling busybodies.

However, it is impossible to secure one's own good without a sound political structure around you. Prudence is not science, as we have said, because it apprehends the last step, while intuition apprehends the first definitions.

IX: We must try to grasp the nature of deliberation, for it is not the same thing as enquiry. Neither is it conjecture, for that is a rapid thing while deliberation takes some time.

It is true that one who deliberates badly makes errors, but a wicked person can deliberate well to achieve an evil end.

So good deliberation is that which succeeds in relation to a particular end. X: There is also understanding, which is not the same as scientific knowledge or opinion.

Nor is it like prudence, which deals of what one should or should not do. Understanding only makes judgements, for there is no difference between good and bad understanding.

XI: What is called judgement is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable. And equitable judgement is sympathetic judgement.

All these states of mind naturally tend to converge so that we call a person understanding, prudent or intelligent more or less indifferently.

We should, however, give more attention to the opinions of older, more experienced people, even without demonstrations of fact, because age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement.

XII: What is the use of the intellectual virtues? They are concerned with the just and the admirable and the good, but knowing them does not mean that they are put into practice.

Just as it is possible to know medicine or physical training without practising it. First, wisdom and prudence, being virtues, must be desirable in themselves, even without any result.

Next, they do, in fact, produce a result- wisdom is a virtue which makes a person happy by the possession of it. We ought also to consider cleverness, which is the ability to achieve an aim.

The aim can be noble or base, which is why we may call both prudent and unscrupulous people clever. Prudence is not quite the same, for insight cannot lead to prudence without some virtue.

XIII: We must now reconsider virtue. If we have a disposition towards justice or temperance or courage, then we have it from our birth, but moral qualities are acquired.

Some people, including Socrates, claimed that all the virtues are forms of prudence. But we must go further and say that virtue is not merely a state conforming to the right principle, but one that is inseparable from it.

At the same time, prudence does not use wisdom, but allows it to be realised. To say otherwise would be like saying that the State controls the gods because it directs rituals.

I: There are three states of character to be avoided: vice, incontinence and brutishness. The contrary of vice is virtue and of incontinence is continence.

The opposite of brutishness is something like superhuman virtue, as Homer says of Hector:. But as divinity is rare among men, so is true brutishness, though it is commonest among non-Greeks.

We must now discuss incontinence, effeminacy and endurance. II: Socrates said that nobody consciously acts against what is best, other than through ignorance.

This is inconsistent with the evidence, for we see that men often act out of the impulse of desire and against their knowledge and judgement.

Again, the sophists trap people by knotty arguments into believing what is good is bad. III: We must consider whether incontinent people act knowingly or unknowingly- whether the incontinent man is so because of his circumstances or his attitude.

Firstly, for a man to do wrong without reflecting on his own knowledge is very different from acting with that knowledge. Secondly, there are two types of practical knowledge that act as the starting-point to actions.

These are the universal and the particular premises. The universal is knowledge about things and the particular is knowledge about how they should be acted upon.

But a man may know both without drawing the correct conclusion. For instance, he might know that "savoury food is more wholesome than sweet" and also "wholesome food should be eaten" but he may not put the two together and actually choose to eat savoury foods.

Thirdly, we may assume that incontinent people are like those asleep, or drunk, or mentally disturbed or in the grip of temper or sexual craving, who speak and act without knowledge.

Fourth, even if a man knows both the universal and particular premises his natural desires may sway his scientific judgement.

IV: Is anyone absolutely incontinent, or only in certain respects? It is obvious that continence or incontinence are concerned with pleasures and pains.

Now, certain pleasures, such as food and sex, are necessary, others, like victory or honour or wealth are merely desirable. Those who are incontinent in the second type we do not call simply incontinent, but add "in respect of money" or some other qualification.

People are not blamed for liking them, only for doing so to excess, like those who pursue some good end in the wrong way, like Satyrus' excessive infatuation with his father.

V: Some things are not naturally pleasant, but can become so through injury, habit or congenital depravity. And for each unnatural pleasure there is an abnormal state of character.

There is the brutish character, as in those tribes around the Black Sea who eat human flesh. Also, morbid states, like nail-biting or homosexuality, may come naturally to some people, or may have been acquired by habit, for instance if someone has been sexually misused as a child.

Where nature is the cause, we do not blame people as incontinent. But those congenitally incapable of reason we call brutish, and those troubled by illness we call morbid.

VI: Let us consider if incontinence of temper, which is anger, is different to incontinence of desire. Unlike desire, temper seems to have some reason to it, but to, as it were, listen imperfectly- like the over-eager servant who rushes off before his master has finished giving instruction.

When reason informs someone that they are being insulted, temper sees such a person as an enemy. It is partly pardonable to be guided by the natural appetites we all share.

But incontinence of desire is a vice, for it is led by pleasure. We do not condemn the brutes as intemperate or licentious because they possess neither choice nor calculation.

So, though brutishness is frightening it carries no corruption of the highest reasoning. A bad man can do much more harm than a brute. VII: We have noted that some pleasures are necessary, but only up to a point.

The man who pursues excessive pleasures is licentious, because he is unrepentant. On the other hand, the man deficient in the appreciation of pleasures is the opposite of licentious, while the temperate man is between the two.

The difference is between those who yield from choice and those who do not. Anyone would think worse of someone who thrashed another having thought about it carefully, than of someone who acted in a moment of passion.

The man who fails to endure everyday pains is soft and effeminate, unless his weakness is due to some congenital defect, like the hereditary effeminacy of Scythian aristocrats.

The lover of amusement is also thought licentious, but he is really soft, for amusement is excessive indulgence in relaxation.

VIII: In general vice is unconscious, incontinence is not. So incontinence is not vice and the incontinent are not wicked, though they do wicked things.

The incontinent man is one who is impelled by his feelings to deviate from the right principle, but is not so completely mastered as to pursue such pleasures unrestrainedly.

IX: We must ask whether virtue consists of abiding by any choice or principle, or only by following the right one. Some people cling doggedly to their opinion, whom we call obstinate.

They can be divided into the opinionated, the ignorant and the boorish. The opinionated are motivated by pleasure and pain and enjoy a sense of superiority.

Thus they resemble the incontinent. The incontinent and the licentious man both pursue bodily pleasures, but the first thinks it is wrong while the second does not.

X: The prudent man is morally good. But simply knowing what is right does not make a man prudent, he must be inclined to actually do it,.

The incontinent man is not so disposed. He is like a State which has good laws, but fails to implement them, while the bad man is like a State that actually does implement its bad laws.

XI: So is pleasure good? Some say that pleasure is not a good because it hinders thinking. Others that some pleasures are disgraceful or harmful, and others that pleasure cannot be the supreme good because it is not an end but a process.

XII: This does not prove that pleasure is not a good. I Things are called good either absolutely, or good for somebody. II A good may be an activity or a condition.

III The argument that there must be something better than pleasure because the end is better than the process is not conclusive because pleasures are a species of activity, and therefore an end.

The argument that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are injurious is no better than saying that healthy things are bad because some of them are bad for the pocket.

But, clearly, the pleasures of brutes and children are not good. XIII: Pain is clearly an evil to be avoided. Now, the opposite of pain is pleasure, so it must be good.

When Speusippus argued that good is contrary to both pleasure and pain, he cannot be correct, for he refused to allow that pleasure is an evil. Different people may pursue different pleasures, but it is always pleasure which they pursue.

XIV: Those who think that some noble pleasures are highly desirable, but bodily pleasures are not, ought to consider why, in that case, the pains which are contrary to them are bad, for the contrary of a bad thing is a good one.

Everyone enjoys tasty food and wine and sex to some degree, but not everyone to the right degree.

With pain, it is the opposite. The bad man shuns, not just excessive pain, but all pain. Now, pleasure drives out pain. But it is not possible for the same thing always to give pleasure for our nature contains different elements which are rarely in balance.

Only God could enjoy one simple pleasure forever. I: Friendship is a kind of virtue, or implies virtue. It is necessary for living, for nobody would choose to live without friends.

When we are young, friends keep us from mistakes. When we are old they care for us. In the prime of life, they encourage us.

Friendship is the bond that holds communities together. Some say with Empedocles that 'like is drawn to like', others with Heraclitus that 'opposition unites'.

But these matters can wait. II: It might help if we could define what an object of affection is. Is it the good that people love, or only what is good for them?

These sometimes conflict. We do not speak of friendship about our affection for inanimate objects, because there is no return of affection.

It would be absurd for a man to wish for the good of his wine. III: There are three kinds of friendship. Some, especially the old or the ambitious, love from utility, to derive benefit from the friendship.

Sometimes such people do not even like each other, as with friendship with foreigners. Those who love on the grounds of pleasure are motivated by their own pleasure.

This is commonest among the young and with erotic friendship. Such can rise and fall very quickly. Only the friendship of those who are similarly truly good is perfect, but it is rare, as good man are rare.

IV: With friendship for the sake of pleasure, as beauty wanes, so often the friendship wanes too. Pleasure or utility friendship is possible between two bad men, but obviously only good men can be friends for their own sakes.

V: Friends who spend their time together confer mutual benefit. When they are asleep or apart, they retain the disposition to do so.

But if the absence long it often makes men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'.

VI: Friendship arises less readily among sour and elderly people. Young men become friends much more quickly and easily than older men, although the latter may still be well-disposed toward others.

On the other hand, to have many perfect friends is no more possible than to be in love with many people at once, for love is a kind of excess of friendship.

VII: Another kind of friendship involves superiority, as the affection of father for son, husband for wife or master for servant.

In such cases, affection is proportionate to merit; the better person must be loved more than he loves. There is a great gulf in the form of affection between ordinary people and gods or royalty.

This raises a problem as to whether friends do actually wish each other the greatest of goods, ie to be a god, because they will no longer have them as friends.

It seems, then, that a friend will wish for the best for a human being, but presumably will reserve the very best of these for himself. VIII: Most people seem to want to be loved rather than to love.

For honour is men's confirmation of their own opinion of themselves. But people enjoy being loved for its own sake, so it may be supposed that being loved is better than being honoured.

Friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection, as we see in the joy that mothers show in loving their children. A friendship of utility occurs between unequals, such as the poor and the rich, or the ignorant and the scholarly man, but only inasmuch as each can get something in return.

We might add here the sort of lovers who make themselves look ridiculous by demanding to be loved as much as they love. This may be connected with the attraction of difference, but it is irrelevant to our enquiry.

IX: There is some similarity, as we have said, between friendship and justice, as is seen in the wider community.

The whole State community, we presume, was originally formed for mutual advantage, just as sailors join together to run the ship or businessmen to make money, or soldiers look to plunder or conquest.

X: There are three kinds of political constitution, and an equal number of perversions of them. Monarchy is the best form, but can degenerate into tyranny when the ruler begins to pursue his own interests above those of his subjects.

Aristocracy can degenerate into rule according to property ownership, which we call timocracy, where corrupt officials share the resources of the state.

Timocracy itself can disintegrate into democracy, which is not nearly so bad. There are analogies in the household, where the relationship of fathers and sons is a sort of monarchy, though the way in which Persians treat their sons more resembles tyranny.

The association of husband and wife is clearly aristocratic, while of brothers is like to timocracy. Democracy is like a household with a weak head so that everyone can do as they wish.

XI: In each of these political constitutions there is a sort of friendship to the same extent as there is justice.

There is the friendship of a king for his subjects.

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Are we being asked to make a choice in values? Such a choice could have no basis but chance or personal whim, since no pre-existing value could guide us between two incompatible value-systems.

This, you might say, is the existentialist interpretation of the book: the primacy of choice over values. Yet other options are available. There is also the unmistakable autobiographical element in this writing, since Kierkegaard had not long before broken off his own engagement.

This is just to scrape the surface of possibility. On the one hand, this book is highly rich and suggestive, with brilliant passages buried amid piles of less compelling material.

Since no clear message emerges, and since there are no arguments to guide the way, the book can easily yield interpretations consonant with pre-conceived opinions.

In other words, it is hard to me to imagine somebody being convinced to change their mind by reading this. But Kierkegaard can perhaps better be likened to a good art critic than to a systematic philosopher, for the value in his writing consists more in illuminating comments than in a final conclusion.

At times he rises to commanding eloquence; but so often he seems to wallow in confusing and repetitive intricacies.

More to the point, I find the general tenor of his writing to be anti-rationalist; and this is exemplified in the complete lack of argument in his writings.

But nobody could deny that, all told, this is an extraordinary book and a worthy addition to the philosophical tradition. View all 9 comments.

Nov 09, Brent McCulley rated it it was amazing Shelves: philosophy. Easily one of the best books I have read this year, as this year nears the end, I can say without a doubt that Kierkegaard was truly a genius.

It is not without purpose that my mind immediately rushes to Nietzsche pithy aphorism on genius wherein he writes, "Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than being misunderstood.

In the latter case, perhaps his vanity suffers, but the former hurts his heart, his sympathy, which always says, "Alas, why do you want to have it as hard as I d Easily one of the best books I have read this year, as this year nears the end, I can say without a doubt that Kierkegaard was truly a genius.

In the latter case, perhaps his vanity suffers, but the former hurts his heart, his sympathy, which always says, "Alas, why do you want to have it as hard as I did?

Kierkegaard knew that he was a genius, yet he also knew that he was misunderstood. This seems to me not to be a accidental product of the Danish culture's ability to exegete Kierkegaard properly, but rather, an intentional property postulated by Kierkegaard himself within his writings for the sole purpose of protecting "his heart, his sympathy" as Nietzsche said.

While reading through the "Either" part, I felt ecstatic, aroused, and excited, as the aesthetic appeal and philosophical dialectic that A engages in truly is seductive.

The first portion is a bunch of aphorisms whereof all are highly quotable and attractive, and standard Kierkegaard.

He then deals with the dialectic progression of the erotic understanding in music, and analyzes Mozart among others. Kierkegaard then deals with the Ancient's understanding of tragedy juxtaposed to the modern understanding of tragedy.

In "Shadowgraphs," Kierkegaard deals with the aesthetic elements of theater and the psychological development of the aforesaid in the subject.

My two favorite essays, however, are the next two which are entitled "The Unhappiest One" and "Crop Rotation. Both are written so fantastically that it hard not to agree with everything he says.

My understanding of Either could only have developed after reading Or , and it's understandable why Kierkegaard got so mad seeing Danish bookstores lined with the former whilst the latter went neglected compared to the former.

They must be read in conjunction with one another, because all the ideas presented in both are not necessarily Kierkegaard's own ideas: this is a partial reason for the pseudonyms.

Since this was Kierkegaard's first major work, written mostly in Germany in a short amount of time while he was attending the Schelling lectures, the breakup with Regine, his then fiancee, would have been extremely fresh.

The aesthetic part of Either seems to be Kierkegaard's self-justification of the breakup, rationalizing that it was done in protection of Regine, and also, at the consummation of what Kierkegaard calls "first love.

Certainly, then, The Seducer's diary can be read in a but of an autobiographical flair, and indeed it writes like one, although often times Kierkegaard flips the subjects around.

What is more interesting is when I got to the Or portion. Written by a venerable Judge Wilhelm, they are two letters of correspondence to A, as in the 'novel' both the Judge and A are good friends, and A often comes over frequently to dine and spend time with the Judge and his wife.

The Judge systematically tries to refute the aesthetic in each theory postulated, and ultimately show the validity of marriage ethically and also aesthetically.

So far, then, it is not a matter of the choice of some thing, not a matter of the reality of the thing chosen, but of the reality of choosing.

It is this, though, that is decisive and what I shall try to awaken you to Through the absolute choice, then, the ethical is posited, but from that it by no means follows that the aesthetic is excluded.

In the ethical the personality is centered in itself; the aesthetic is thus excluded absolutely, or it is excluded as the absolute, but relatively it always stays behind.

The personality, through choosing itself, chooses itself ethically and excludes the aesthetic absolutely; but since it is, after all, he himself the person chooses and through choosing himself does not become another nature but remains himself, the whole of the aesthetic returns in its relativity" pp.

This is utterly brilliant, and to be sure, much of what Kierkegaard writes through the Judge are philosophical ideas that are further developed in his later works such as the movement from the aesthetic to the religious to the ethical in his Stages on Life's Way , and also the idea of choosing the self which lies in the infinite or absolute in The Sickness unto Death.

The idea that Judge defends from the above, and indeed throughout his two essays to A, is that the aesthetic cannot be chosen as the absolute, because it is not a choice at all, but rather a defiance or privation away from the absolute, and hence because the self is lost, it follows that the self cannot choose the aesthetic since their is no self to do the choosing.

Yet, when one postulates the ethical as the absolute, the self chooses absolutely because the choice is choosing yourself, which only can be found in the ethical, and because the ethical is the absolute, and the self is chosen, the aesthetic no thereby nullified as A would like to suppose, but is in fact affirmed, albeit in the relative sense of the subject.

And so it follows that marriage, which is the ethical choice, affirms both the ethical and the aesthetic, the moral and the sensual.

What is so paradoxical about all this is that Kierkegaard is writing this only because he was able to since he broke off engagement with his previous fiancee, Regine Olson.

Affirming the ethical validity of marriage, writing as the Judge, only after he denied it's validity practically by rejecting Regine.

Incidentally enough, Kierkegaard would later regret not marrying, which makes his aphorism in the beginning of the book all the more poignant and chagrin.

If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry, you will also regret it; if you marry or if you do not marry, you will regret both; whether you marry or you do not marry, you will regret both" p.

View 1 comment. Jan 28, Sean Blake rated it it was amazing Shelves: religion , philosophy , fiction. Soren Kierkegaard writes like a poet, which makes his philosophical writings so entertaining and enlightening to read.

A guide to a meaningful existence, Kierkegaard explores the aesthetic and ethical ideologies of life through two characters: A , the aesthetician and Judge Wilhelm , the ethicist.

Part I is an exploration of aesthetic ideologies discussing music, poetry, boredom and which also includes Diary of a Seducer , a lovely little psychological novel within the book in which a calculated aesthetician seducts and then rejects the love of a woman.

Here, he takes his time, in two long letters, to explain how we should live our life, the choices we make and the extremities of certain life views.

With this structure, Kierkegaard explores human nature philosophically, psychologically, religiously and poetically in his first published work.

It's an exceptionally complex book but, in the end, it's extremely rewarding. View 2 comments. Sep 09, AJ Griffin rated it really liked it.

This is one of those books that you read that covers a bunch of things you had been thinking about on your own, at which point you realize "oh: i'm not really that smart, am I?

View all 3 comments. Mar 23, Khashayar Mohammadi rated it really liked it Shelves: favorites , essays , philosophy , writing-inspiration , faith-spirituality , scandinavian-lit.

Its definitely one of my all time favorites, not just philosophically, but over-all. Kierkegaard is more a writer than a philosopher, such that in poetic congruence with the themes of this book, his writing never ceases to be Aesthetic, but it does cease to be philosophical?

But does it really? The first few hundred pages leading up to the second part can be utterly confusing, since they only find meaning in opposition of the discourse of Judge Vilhelm.

Maybe I hesitate to give this book five stars merely because it has pulled a "twist ending" of sorts that forces me to re-read the first pages in order to fully understand the rest.

This book is in fact a thousand pages long. Though I can't say I cared much about the endless discourse on "Don Giovanni" Which ends up costing you a good couple hundred pages if you're in the same ship as I am , I found the last chapter, "The Equilibrium between the Aesthetic and the Ethical" to be breath-takingly eye-opening.

There were parts were a dozen pages were written with heart-piercing accuracy mocking the self-induced despair that we can still see to this day among us.

Its a fantastic book, and like all other books I have of Kierkegaard, it shall never leave my bedside table. Feb 17, Matt rated it really liked it Shelves: wisdom-philosophical-investigatons , worldly-lit , loose-baggy-monsters , existentialism.

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, click here. Astound the girl next door with my velvet suit and Faustus hood?

Not take her to movies, but to cemetaries Whether its better to settle down and get married or to try and live zestfully as a single person.

And we may likewise divide the rational into the scientific, which deals of things invariable, and the calculative, which deals with the variable.

II: In the soul three things control actions; sensation, intellect and appetite. Since moral virtue involves choice, and choice is deliberate appetite then, if the choice is to be good, the reasoning behind it must be true and the desire right.

The origin of action is choice, and the origin of choice is appetite and purposive reasoning. But no process is set going by mere thought- only by practical thought.

Anyone who makes anything makes if for a purpose relative to a particular end. But action is an end in itself, and man is the causative union of reason and appetite.

No past event is an object of choice; hence, Agathon was right to say: One thing is denied even to God To undo what has been already done III: To look further back, we can say that there are five ways in which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation or denial; by art, science, prudence, wisdom and intuition.

Judgement and opinion need not be included as they can often err. Science aims at knowledge of the eternal and is supposed to be teachable.

But all teaching starts from what is known either by induction of first principles or by deduction from those first principles. This is our description of scientific knowledge.

IV: Art, or craft skill, is concerned with bringing something into existence, the cause of which is reasoned in the producer not the product.

Since production is different to action, art is not concerned with action but has an element of chance, as Agathon says: Art loves chance, and chance loves art.

V: To understand prudence, or practical wisdom, we may consider what type of person we call prudent.

A prudent man is able to deliberate rightly, not just about particular things like health, but about the good life generally. As prudence is not a fixed thing, then it cannot be a science.

It does not aim at production, so it is not an art. Prudence, then, is a virtue, and one which is of the calculative, reasoning part of the soul. But it is not merely a rational state, for such can be forgotten while prudence cannot.

VI: Let us consider intuition. All science comes from certain first principles, so it follows that those principles cannot themselves be comprehended by science, or by art, or prudence or even by wisdom.

The state of mind which apprehends first principles is intuition. VII: When we call Phidias a wise sculptor or Polyclitus a wise portraitist we mean that they have artistic wisdom.

But some people are not wise 'at something' but wise without any qualification. Wisdom, therefore, seems the most finished form of knowledge.

Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious. That is why a wise person can often be more effective in action than one with specialist knowledge.

VIII: Prudence and political science are the same state of mind, but they are realised differently. The man who knows and provides for his own interests is called prudent, but politicians are considered meddling busybodies.

However, it is impossible to secure one's own good without a sound political structure around you. Prudence is not science, as we have said, because it apprehends the last step, while intuition apprehends the first definitions.

IX: We must try to grasp the nature of deliberation, for it is not the same thing as enquiry. Neither is it conjecture, for that is a rapid thing while deliberation takes some time.

It is true that one who deliberates badly makes errors, but a wicked person can deliberate well to achieve an evil end. So good deliberation is that which succeeds in relation to a particular end.

X: There is also understanding, which is not the same as scientific knowledge or opinion. Nor is it like prudence, which deals of what one should or should not do.

Understanding only makes judgements, for there is no difference between good and bad understanding. XI: What is called judgement is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable.

And equitable judgement is sympathetic judgement. All these states of mind naturally tend to converge so that we call a person understanding, prudent or intelligent more or less indifferently.

We should, however, give more attention to the opinions of older, more experienced people, even without demonstrations of fact, because age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement.

XII: What is the use of the intellectual virtues? They are concerned with the just and the admirable and the good, but knowing them does not mean that they are put into practice.

Just as it is possible to know medicine or physical training without practising it. First, wisdom and prudence, being virtues, must be desirable in themselves, even without any result.

Next, they do, in fact, produce a result- wisdom is a virtue which makes a person happy by the possession of it.

We ought also to consider cleverness, which is the ability to achieve an aim. The aim can be noble or base, which is why we may call both prudent and unscrupulous people clever.

Prudence is not quite the same, for insight cannot lead to prudence without some virtue. XIII: We must now reconsider virtue.

If we have a disposition towards justice or temperance or courage, then we have it from our birth, but moral qualities are acquired.

Some people, including Socrates, claimed that all the virtues are forms of prudence. But we must go further and say that virtue is not merely a state conforming to the right principle, but one that is inseparable from it.

At the same time, prudence does not use wisdom, but allows it to be realised. To say otherwise would be like saying that the State controls the gods because it directs rituals.

I: There are three states of character to be avoided: vice, incontinence and brutishness. The contrary of vice is virtue and of incontinence is continence.

The opposite of brutishness is something like superhuman virtue, as Homer says of Hector:. But as divinity is rare among men, so is true brutishness, though it is commonest among non-Greeks.

We must now discuss incontinence, effeminacy and endurance. II: Socrates said that nobody consciously acts against what is best, other than through ignorance.

This is inconsistent with the evidence, for we see that men often act out of the impulse of desire and against their knowledge and judgement.

Again, the sophists trap people by knotty arguments into believing what is good is bad. III: We must consider whether incontinent people act knowingly or unknowingly- whether the incontinent man is so because of his circumstances or his attitude.

Firstly, for a man to do wrong without reflecting on his own knowledge is very different from acting with that knowledge.

Secondly, there are two types of practical knowledge that act as the starting-point to actions.

These are the universal and the particular premises. The universal is knowledge about things and the particular is knowledge about how they should be acted upon.

But a man may know both without drawing the correct conclusion. For instance, he might know that "savoury food is more wholesome than sweet" and also "wholesome food should be eaten" but he may not put the two together and actually choose to eat savoury foods.

Thirdly, we may assume that incontinent people are like those asleep, or drunk, or mentally disturbed or in the grip of temper or sexual craving, who speak and act without knowledge.

Fourth, even if a man knows both the universal and particular premises his natural desires may sway his scientific judgement.

IV: Is anyone absolutely incontinent, or only in certain respects? It is obvious that continence or incontinence are concerned with pleasures and pains.

Now, certain pleasures, such as food and sex, are necessary, others, like victory or honour or wealth are merely desirable. Those who are incontinent in the second type we do not call simply incontinent, but add "in respect of money" or some other qualification.

People are not blamed for liking them, only for doing so to excess, like those who pursue some good end in the wrong way, like Satyrus' excessive infatuation with his father.

V: Some things are not naturally pleasant, but can become so through injury, habit or congenital depravity. And for each unnatural pleasure there is an abnormal state of character.

There is the brutish character, as in those tribes around the Black Sea who eat human flesh. Also, morbid states, like nail-biting or homosexuality, may come naturally to some people, or may have been acquired by habit, for instance if someone has been sexually misused as a child.

Where nature is the cause, we do not blame people as incontinent. But those congenitally incapable of reason we call brutish, and those troubled by illness we call morbid.

VI: Let us consider if incontinence of temper, which is anger, is different to incontinence of desire. Unlike desire, temper seems to have some reason to it, but to, as it were, listen imperfectly- like the over-eager servant who rushes off before his master has finished giving instruction.

When reason informs someone that they are being insulted, temper sees such a person as an enemy. It is partly pardonable to be guided by the natural appetites we all share.

But incontinence of desire is a vice, for it is led by pleasure. We do not condemn the brutes as intemperate or licentious because they possess neither choice nor calculation.

So, though brutishness is frightening it carries no corruption of the highest reasoning. A bad man can do much more harm than a brute.

VII: We have noted that some pleasures are necessary, but only up to a point. The man who pursues excessive pleasures is licentious, because he is unrepentant.

On the other hand, the man deficient in the appreciation of pleasures is the opposite of licentious, while the temperate man is between the two.

The difference is between those who yield from choice and those who do not. Anyone would think worse of someone who thrashed another having thought about it carefully, than of someone who acted in a moment of passion.

The man who fails to endure everyday pains is soft and effeminate, unless his weakness is due to some congenital defect, like the hereditary effeminacy of Scythian aristocrats.

The lover of amusement is also thought licentious, but he is really soft, for amusement is excessive indulgence in relaxation.

VIII: In general vice is unconscious, incontinence is not. So incontinence is not vice and the incontinent are not wicked, though they do wicked things.

The incontinent man is one who is impelled by his feelings to deviate from the right principle, but is not so completely mastered as to pursue such pleasures unrestrainedly.

IX: We must ask whether virtue consists of abiding by any choice or principle, or only by following the right one. Some people cling doggedly to their opinion, whom we call obstinate.

They can be divided into the opinionated, the ignorant and the boorish. The opinionated are motivated by pleasure and pain and enjoy a sense of superiority.

Thus they resemble the incontinent. The incontinent and the licentious man both pursue bodily pleasures, but the first thinks it is wrong while the second does not.

X: The prudent man is morally good. But simply knowing what is right does not make a man prudent, he must be inclined to actually do it,.

The incontinent man is not so disposed. He is like a State which has good laws, but fails to implement them, while the bad man is like a State that actually does implement its bad laws.

XI: So is pleasure good? Some say that pleasure is not a good because it hinders thinking. Others that some pleasures are disgraceful or harmful, and others that pleasure cannot be the supreme good because it is not an end but a process.

XII: This does not prove that pleasure is not a good. I Things are called good either absolutely, or good for somebody.

II A good may be an activity or a condition. III The argument that there must be something better than pleasure because the end is better than the process is not conclusive because pleasures are a species of activity, and therefore an end.

The argument that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are injurious is no better than saying that healthy things are bad because some of them are bad for the pocket.

But, clearly, the pleasures of brutes and children are not good. XIII: Pain is clearly an evil to be avoided. Now, the opposite of pain is pleasure, so it must be good.

When Speusippus argued that good is contrary to both pleasure and pain, he cannot be correct, for he refused to allow that pleasure is an evil.

Different people may pursue different pleasures, but it is always pleasure which they pursue. XIV: Those who think that some noble pleasures are highly desirable, but bodily pleasures are not, ought to consider why, in that case, the pains which are contrary to them are bad, for the contrary of a bad thing is a good one.

Everyone enjoys tasty food and wine and sex to some degree, but not everyone to the right degree. With pain, it is the opposite.

The bad man shuns, not just excessive pain, but all pain. Now, pleasure drives out pain. But it is not possible for the same thing always to give pleasure for our nature contains different elements which are rarely in balance.

Only God could enjoy one simple pleasure forever. I: Friendship is a kind of virtue, or implies virtue. It is necessary for living, for nobody would choose to live without friends.

When we are young, friends keep us from mistakes. When we are old they care for us. In the prime of life, they encourage us. Friendship is the bond that holds communities together.

Some say with Empedocles that 'like is drawn to like', others with Heraclitus that 'opposition unites'.

But these matters can wait. II: It might help if we could define what an object of affection is. Is it the good that people love, or only what is good for them?

These sometimes conflict. We do not speak of friendship about our affection for inanimate objects, because there is no return of affection.

It would be absurd for a man to wish for the good of his wine. III: There are three kinds of friendship. Some, especially the old or the ambitious, love from utility, to derive benefit from the friendship.

Sometimes such people do not even like each other, as with friendship with foreigners. Those who love on the grounds of pleasure are motivated by their own pleasure.

This is commonest among the young and with erotic friendship.

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